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This paper will not seek to repeat what was written in its companion paper on what 
went wrong from the US perspective,
1 especially as regards non-legal factors. Most of 
these factors have also played a role in Europe, for instance, technical factors such as 
the delayed onset of convergence and the persistence of high sunk costs, or 
commercial factors such as lack of sufficient demand for many new services or 
disregard for revenue prospects. 
 
Rather, the aim of this paper is to look at a number of perhaps more Europe-specific 
causes for the woes of the telecom sector (II), and in particular at flaws and 
shortcomings in the EC legal framework which might have contributed to those woes 
(III). Of course, in so doing, it is difficult not to indulge in the temptation of assessing 
whether these flaws and shortcoming have been made good in the new EC framework 
for electronic communications, which is now being implemented in practice.
2 Before 
doing so, however, it is appropriate to take a critical look at the basic assumption 
under which this paper was commissioned, namely that European telecommunications 
have gone wrong (I). 
 
I.  WHAT WENT RIGHT AND WHAT WENT WRONG 
 
It is undeniable that a sense of gloom prevails over the whole European 
telecommunications sector since 2000, and that it is only slowly receding. 
 
Nevertheless, one should not be drawn to hasty conclusions. In fact, the assessment of 
the current situation depends in great part upon the eye of the beholder: it is likely that 
users, policymakers and operators will hold a different view. 
 
A.  From a user perspective 
 
From a user perspective, the recent years have generally been positive. An 
examination of the annual Implementation Reports of the Commission
3 produces the 
following picture: 
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-  Prices have gone down markedly overall since 1998. Not all services have 
seen their price decrease in the same fashion: the reduction was most notable 
for certain types of fixed telecommunications (long-distance and 
international), mobile telecommunications and Internet access. On the other 
hand, the price of local fixed communications has not decreased much, and the 
basic fixed line subscription has in some Member States become more 
expensive as a result of tariff re-balancing. In addition, newcomers generally 
price their services substantially lower than incumbents, which gives extra 
opportunities to the customer. Overall, both residential and business customers 
have seen their telecommunications expenditure decrease markedly over the 
last 5 years. 
-  Customers now have a choice of operators for all segments of the 
telecommunications sector, be it fixed local calls, fixed long-distance and 
international calls, mobile communications or Internet access. Competitors of 
the incumbents operate on a variety of bases, using carrier selection, carrier 
pre-selection or their own facilities (including the unbundled local loop). In 
line with a current of economic theory, the Commission uses five competitors 
as the reference figure for a competitive market. On this count, there are still 
some black spots regarding some sectors (especially at the local level) in some 
Member States. Five years down the road from full liberalisation, these figures 
might not be as impressive as some forecasts would have wanted, but 
nevertheless it appears that competition is taking hold and remaining firm, 
even in a time of consolidation. 
 
The Commission observes, however, that the market shares of the incumbents on all 
segments of fixed telecommunications remain fairly high, while mobile 
communications evidence a much more “balanced” market structure. With respect to 
fixed local communications, for instance, the incumbents usually still hold more than 
90% of the market, and in other segments they tend to remain comfortably above 
50%.
4 Furthermore, as the Commission observes, delays in implementing local loop 
unbundling have meant that incumbents have built a comfortable headstart in the 
provision of broadband Internet access.
5 We will discuss later the extent to which 
lasting high market shares on the part of the incumbent should be interpreted as a sign 
of failure of the liberalisation enterprise.
6 
 
In its reports, the Commission also looks into quality of service, without however 
reaching conclusions.
7 N evertheless, it is common experience that the quality of 
service has significantly increased in the European telecommunications sector. For 
instance, the introduction of the latest technological developments (fixed broadband 
through cable or ADSL, GPRS, UMTS) is taking place ahead of, or at least at the 
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same time as, the rest of the world. As regards the traditional offerings of fixed voice 
communications, the improvements have been felt not so much on the technological 
quality of the service as such, but rather on the anciallary services (ordering, billing, 
maintenance, added features, etc.), here as well bringing the EU up to world 
standards. Business customers, in particular, who provided much of the impetus 
behind the liberalization drive, have been able to obtain services coming much closer 
to their requirements of seamlessness and uniformity. 
 
B.  From a policymaker perspective 
 
Here the situation is somewhat less positive, but by no means tragic. If one looks 
backwards, it can be seen that the main goals of the 1998 liberalization package 
(hereinafter ONP 1998),
8 as they were set out in the main policy documents 
underlying that package,
9 were reached to a significant extent: 
 
-  The rationale for liberalization and the introduction of competition in the 
sector was to  increase efficiency, both productive
10 and allocative.
11 The 
evidence reviewed above would seem to point out to a measure of success in 
reaching that objective. 
-  At the same time, social policy aspects, in particular universal service, were to 
be preserved  – even enhanced  – in the liberalized era. According to the 
Commission reports, this goal has been reached.
12 
-  Similarly, the European telecommunications sector was to become more 
innovative, so as to overcome a perceived backwardness in comparison to 
trading partners. Here as well, the evidence would point towards this goal 
having been achieved in great part, as mentioned previously. 
-  Liberalization and the onset of competition were also supposed to strengthen 
the sector and make it more competitive on the international scene. Following 
the burst of the dotcom and telecom bubbles, it can be argued that this goal has 
not been met, especially since it appears that the most healthy firms in the 
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protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector [1998] OJ L 24/1 and (ii) based on Article 86 
EC: Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services 
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9 See for the Commission, the Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure 
and cable television networks, Part I, COM(94)440 (25 October 1994) and Part II, COM(94)682 (25 
January 1995), for the Council, the Resolutions of 22 December 1994 [1994] OJ C 379/4 and 18 
September 1995 [1995] OJ C 258/1 and for the EP, the Resolutions of 7 April 1995 [1995] OJ C 
109/310 and 10 May 1995 [1995] OJ C 151/479. 
10 I.e. the sector would increase its output and reduce its inputs. 
11 I.e. producer surplus in a monopoly setting would be transferred to customers, who would benefit 
from lower prices and increased choice, increasing overall welfare. 
12 See the 8
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European telecommunications sector now are those who  took the most 
conservative approach to the developments in the sector (e.g. Belgacom). 
-  Finally, the internal market goals were not achieved, and certainly not with 
respect to telecommunications services, as will be discussed below. 
 
The situation is less satisfactory when looking ahead. The main policy issues of the 
moment do not appear to be on their way to a successful outcome. For one, the 
experience with the introduction of third-generation mobile communications (UMTS) 
shows that the success with GSM is not necessarily replicable – more precisely that 
the mere fact of coordinating the standard and the frequency bands is not sufficient to 
guarantee success.
13 A setback with UMTS could have serious consequences on the 
health of the European telecommunications sector and on its position as a 
technological leader. Similarly, the speed and scope of the rollout of broadband 
services is likely to have a key influence on whether telecommunications continues to 
be an engine for overall growth and whether it contributes to social cohesion or not. 
Policymakers remain unsure as to whether this rollout should be left to market forces 
alone or supported by regulation. A failure in this respect could also change 
drastically the judgment borne on EC telecommunications policy in the future. 
 
C.  From an industry perspective 
 
While the outlook is not so desperate from a user or policymaker perspective, the 
sense of doom comes out more clearly when things are viewed from an industry 
perspective. 
 
The industry enjoyed unprecedented prosperity in the 1990s. In the past years, 
however, the situation was completely reversed. A large proportion of the new 
entrants who blossomed in the boom years disappeared, either in outright 
bankruptcies or after acquisitions. Those who are still left are struggling, although as a 
consequence of consolidation they should be in a better position to compete when the 
industry begins to recover. The incumbents and the other established players did not 
fare much better either. They were spared the spectacular and controversial 
bankruptcies that occurred in the United States (Worldcom, Global Crossing) or in 
neighbouring sectors (Kirch), but nevertheless most of them are crumbling under 
mountains of debt. They have seen their share values reduced to a mere fraction of 
what they were in 2000. They had to abandon ambitious business plans, which in 
some cases has led to painful repositionings (e.g. de-merger of O2 from BT). 
 
The industry is facing a number of difficulties: 
-  The cash flow necessary for large investments in new technologies has dried 
up. The firms themselves are not generating much cash flow given their debt 
level, and banks and private investors are now wary of putting money into 
telecommunications firms. 
-  Too much capacity was rolled out in the 1990s, thereby accelerating the trend 
towards commoditization of the sector. 
-  Any hopes of escaping commoditization by moving up the value chain into 
“converged services” which would combine content and transmission have 
proved unwarranted so far. Customers do not appear to be interested in these 
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new services – digital pay-TV, third-generation mobile services – or at least 
not to the extent and under the conditions which business plans were banking 
upon. 
 
As a consequence of the difficulties of the telecommunications sector, neighbouring 
sectors have been severely affected. The first attempts at building integrated 
“converged” firms failed: AOL/TimeWarner is struggling after having posted record 
losses and Vivendi/Universal is being dismantled. The market for media content also 
collapsed when the high sums paid to secure premium content (i.e. major sport events) 
turned out to be unrealistic. Communications equipment manufacturers were caught in 
the vendor-financing trap and must now also bear some of the losses themselves. 
Finally, the financial sector overexposed itself to telecommunications (especially with 
the financing of bids for spectrum licences for third-generation mobile services) and 
saw its own health jeopardized as well. 
 
Crisply put, the much-touted “Internet time”, which ran faster than for the rest of the 
economy, has slowed down to a point where it might almost be running behind real 
time. Reality has re-asserted itself in a brutal fashion. 
 
In the end, therefore, as far as European telecommunications are concerned, an 
inquiry into “what went wrong” boils down to aksing how the industry ended up in 
such a dire situation, even though from a user or a policymaker perspective, events 
seem to have unfolded by and large satisfactorily. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF POSSIBLE CAUSES OF DIFFICULTIES 
 
In this section, a number of possible causes for the industry problems are surveyed. 
Only causes that might have played a specific role in Europe – over and above the 
causes identified in the companion paper dealing with the US situation  – are 
discussed. Furthermore, legal causes are left for the following section. 
 
A.  The UMTS experiment 
 
During 2000 and 2001, as provided for in Community law,
14 Member States 
proceeded, each for itself, to assign the rights to use the frequency spectrum reserved 
for third-generation mobile services (UMTS), through beauty contests or more often 
auctions.
15 The assumption was that UMTS would prove a comparable success to the 
second-generation GSM service. At the same time, precisely because of the GSM 
success story,
16 existing operators were very keen to obtain a license, and a number of 
other firms were interested in entering the various national markets. Member States 
also saw the potential for deriving revenue from spectrum auctions, as opposed to the 
beauty contests held for GSM licenses. 
                                                 
14 Decision 128/1999 of 14 December 1998 [1999] OJ L 17/1, Art. 3. 
15 A good overview of the UMTS licensing procedures in the various Member States can be found in 
the report by McKinsey & Co., “Comparative Assessment of the Licensing Regimes for 3G Mobile 
Communications in the European Union and their impact of the Mobile Communications Sector” (July 
2002), available at  http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/radiospec/mobile/ 
studies/index_en.htm (on 2 July 2003). 
16 On this, see J. Pelkmans, “The GSM standard: Explaining a success story”, CEPS Working 
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UMTS therefore gave rise to a large-scale experiment in spectrum assignment 
methods.
17 This experiment ranks both as a leading cause of the current difficulties 
and as the epitome of the excesses of the late 1990s. 
 
Put together, all the licensing procedures brought in € 103,9 billion for the public 
treasuries of the Member States. This overall figure, already fairly impressive, belies a 
fundamental imbalance, since two of the auctions, held early on at the height of the 
bubble, account for most of it. The UK auction, in April 2000, earned € 38,5 billion, 
while the German auction, four months later in August 2000, saw bids go up to € 50,8 
billion. In both cases, this represents more than € 100 per inhabitant per license. The 
amounts spent on acquiring licenses in auctions and other procedures came over and 
above those which the operators already knew they would have to invest in rolling 
out, or upgrading to, third-generation networks.
18 
 
The decline of the telecommunications sector began shortly after the German auction. 
As far as UMTS is concerned, a number of points came to light then. Firstly, the 
mobile communications market was nearing saturation, so that the growth of UMTS 
would have to come from customers switching from GSM rather than from new 
customers. Secondly, the first field tests seemed to show that there was no immediate 
feature of UMTS (no “killer application”) that would draw customers away from 
GSM.
19 Thirdly, some alternative technologies were available or appearing, which 
would offer benefits comparable to UMTS for a fraction of the cost, namely GPRS 
and other upgrades of the GSM standard (for which an existing GSM license was 
sufficient),




Consequently, the market forecasts that underpinned the bids in the various auctions 
had to be abandoned, leaving all the winning bidders straddled with debts. With the 
benefit of hindsight it can be said that the UMTS experiment put all significant 
players on the European telecommunications market in a dire financial situation, 
thereby constituting perhaps the main cause of the industry woes. 
                                                 
17 There was little precedent: no comparable exercise had taken place in Europe before, and the main 
precedent, the auction of the spectrum for second-generation services in the USA (running under the 
name “PCS”), had not been entirely satisfactory, as evidenced by the failure of NextWave in the PCS 
auction. 
18 The precise amount to be invested in third-generation networks depends of course on regulatory 
factors such as deployment schedules or conditions concerning network-sharing arrangements. At the 
time, the winning bidders were expecting to be placed under tight rollout schedules and to be prevented 
from sharing network resources with their competitors, both of which drove up the estimates regarding 
necessary investments. Even in smaller countries, these estimates ran up in the billions of euros. 
19  The main technological proposition of UMTS was the prospect of higher-rate mobile data 
communication. However, consumer appetite for mobile data services had been soured by the 
premature introduction of WAP services running over GSM data, which proved unattractive because of 
the slow speed. 
20 GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) is sometimes presented as generation 2.5 in mobile 
communications, since it adds packet-switching capacities to the GSM standard. While beneath those 
of UMTS, the data rates are vastly superior to circuit-switched GSM data. Other alternative but less 
successful standards include HSCSD (High-Speed Circuit-Switched Data). 
21 IEEE 802.11a, b and now g, often referred to as Wi-Fi. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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B.  Misinformed international strategies on the part of the incumbents 
 
The logic of European liberalization forced incumbents to look beyond their borders 
in a way that they had never done before. Indeed, expansion abroad was seen as 




Initially, given their relative inexperience, the incumbents’ strategy tended to be 
unfocussed at the start, in the first half of the 1990s. In a number of cases, foreign 
participations were undertaken at a relatively high price, and with little prospect of 
synergies ever arising.
23 All major players also entered into so-called “strategic 
alliances” with other incumbents.
24 These alliances were meant to enable the 
participants to reach the level of geographical coverage and technical proficiency 
needed to compete for the business of the leading corporations of the world. Their 
structure was however too loose – and sometimes too awkward – to enable them to 
prosper, especially since here also the market forecasts were overly optimistic.
25 
These strategic alliances were all unwound by 2000. 
 
The larger operators have learnt from their mistakes and in recent years, they have 
pursued international strategies which appear better attuned and which produce more 
synergies, including in particular investment in mobile communications. The strategy 
of Vodafone (admittedly not an incumbent) provides a good example thereof. FT and 
DT have followed a similar path with the respective acquisitions of Orange and 
VoiceStream, both of which do seem to rest on a fairly strong business rationale. 
However, a lot of time, energy and foremost money had first been spent on fruitless 
efforts, so that the incumbents were already indebted and somewhat late when they 
improved their international strategies. 
 
C.  Supply-side approach to technology 
 
When it comes to the large-scale introduction of new technologies, the track record of 
the European telecommunications industry is somewhat puzzling: 
                                                 
22 In principle, if the home market grows significantly, the incumbent can lose market share and still 
maintain modest growth or at least avoid decline. In practice, however, this growth is likely to come 
mostly from new services where the incumbent faces competition from the outset, so that it would not 
reach the same market share as on established market. In the end, the incumbent’s share of the growth 
on the new markets is unlikely to compensate for the losses on traditional markets. 
23 Witness for instance the investments of DT in Telekom Indonesia or of FT in Telecom Argentina, to 
name but two examples. 
24 At one point, the line-up was as follows: Concert comprised BT and MCI, GlobalOne rested on DT, 
FT and Sprint and Unisource/Uniworld brought together Swisscom, KPN, Telia, Telefoníca and 
AT&T. All of these alliances needed some form of clearance under competition law, which gave rise to 
momentous decisions: see Decision 94/579 of 27 July 1994, BT/MCI [1994] OJ L 223/36, Decision 
96/546 of 17 July 1996,  Atlas [1996] OJ L 239/23, Decision 96/547 of 17 July 1996, 
Phoenix/GlobalOne [1996] OJ L 239/57, Decision 97/780 of 29 October 1997, Unisource [1997] OJ L 
318/1 and Decision 97/781 of 29 October 1997, Uniworld [1997] OJ L 381/24. The conditions and 
obligations attached to those decisions are analysed in P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in 
European Telecommunications (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), especially at 302 ff.  
25 Incidentally, the flaws in market projections became clear some years ahead of the general downturn 
in the sector, perhaps as early as  1998 when the partnerships underlying Concert and GlobalOne 
unravelled. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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-  One undeniable success story is the GSM technology. However, it was 
developed in a monopoly context over a fairly long period of time and was 
introduced in either a monopoly or duopoly setting at the beginning of the 
1990s. The major upsurge in penetration and usage in the second half of the 
1990s came through the introduction of pre-paid subscriptions, which were not 
part of the original concept. 
-  The Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) standard, which was 
developed over many years and promoted at great expense, only became 
successful when the Internet boomed. ISDN was then marketed as a means of 
obtaining a better capacity for data transmission. Yet it had been conceived 
primarily as a voice telephony standard that would improve over the 
traditional analogue PSTN offering. 
-  The great popularity of the Short Message Service (SMS) on GSM networks 
should not obscure the fact that SMS was not originally conceived for that 
purpose, but rather to relay messages from the network operator to the user. 
 
The above list does not include any of the outright failures.
26 
In all the cases mentioned above, the ultimate success of the technology was due in 
part or in whole to the discovery of unsuspected but popular markets. This 
discrepancy between the original expectations and the actual outcome reflects a 
“supply-side” approach to technology, where the perception of the suppliers as to 
what their customers might want and what should be the next stage of technological 
evolution seems to play a larger role in the development of technology than the actual 
customer demands. 
 
In recent times, the Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) technology for 
higher-rate data transmission over the local loop provides a counter-example of a 
technology that succeeds on the very proposition for which it was conceived. On the 
other hand, the UMTS standard for third-generation mobile communications appears 
“overspecified”; at the moment, none of the applications envisaged for UMTS appears 
to generate much customer interest or to answer pent-up demand. As mentioned 
earlier, the industry is still looking for the “killer application”. It cannot be excluded 
that the success of UMTS will ultimately rest in an application that was not 
necessarily specified or originally foreseen. 
 
The cases discussed in the previous paragraphs are undoubtedly disparate; they 
concern different technologies, located at different places and levels in 
telecommunications infrastructures and fulfilling different purposes. Nevertheless, 
they share a number of characteristics: since they are used in a network environment, 
these technologies require significant investments in order to deploy them over a 
network. Such deployment also takes time, and often the technology can only be used 
fully once deployment is complete. Yet it is not possible to begin deployment without 
                                                 
26 For instance, the Wireless Access Protocol (WAP), to enable mobile phone to display Internet 
content, which floundered commercially because of insufficient capacity for data transmission over 
traditional GSM networks. It can be speculated that WAP would have experienced a different fate if it 
had been introduced at the same time as more powerful data transmission standards such as GPRS. 
Earlier on, a lot of time and money had been invested in the ERMES paging standard (in parallel with 
the development and introduction of GSM), which became essentially superfluous with the success of 
GSM. Another notable failure in the neighbouring area of broadcasting is the D2-MAC digital TV 
standard. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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having defined in fairly specific terms what the final outcome will be, hence the need 
for standardisation. The inherent investment risk is thus compounded by the time lag 
and the risk that the educated guesses of the developers turn out not to match the 
actual needs of customers.  
 
One must ask, in the end, whether such outcomes can be avoided in a network 
industry. Of course, it is possible to conduct the standardisation process in such a way 
as to leave as much room as possible for unforeseen but popular uses. Relying more 
on software-based implementation can perhaps reduce the time lag. The presence of 
large-scale networks will however always require extensive advance work to ensure 
standardization, compatibility and interoperability. In a multi-layer industry structure, 
where network operators lie between equipment manufacturers and customers, the 
economic models developed for simple two-layer structures (producers and 
customers) do not necessarily work.
27 Network operators have little incentive to take 
part in standard battles, since in most cases they can at most preserve the status quo 
and at worst incur massive losses if they fall on the losing end.
28  
 
The track record of the European industry in the past decades, as sketched out above, 
was not very enviable, and it certainly contributed to putting the industry in the 
position it finds itself now. In all likelihood, the pressures now arising from increased 
competition will push the industry to try to minimize the risks attendant to such a 
supply-side approach to technology, but it is unlikely that this approach will disappear 
altogether. 
 
D.  Persistence of incumbency 
 
As regards fixed communications,
29 a number of business plans from the mid-1990s 
were based on the assumption that the incumbent would be fairly vulnerable and 
would relatively quickly lose a significant part of its market share. This assumption 
did not materialize. Incumbents proved much more resilient than originally thought in 
these business plans, as the figures mentioned earlier demonstrate.
30 
 
Stalling tactics and outright anti-competitive practices on the part of the incumbents 
go some way towards explaining why incumbents retain such a prominent position 
five years after full liberalization. Still this type of behaviour is officially frowned 
upon and actively fought by regulatory and competition authorities. Other factors of a 
more structural nature must also be at work. 
 
As will be further explored below, it could be that the regulatory framework, despite 
the intent of the lawmakers and regulators, cannot guarantee that newcomers will be 
able to establishing themselves on the market. 
 
Beyond that, however, it would seem that the incumbent indeed benefits from some 
type of inertia. Even if switching costs are kept low, customers still hesitate to move 
away from the incumbent. A fairly large number of customers  – residential and 
                                                 
27 These models are well outlined in S.M. Besen and J. Farrell, “Choosing How to Compete: Strategies 
and Tactics in Standardization” (1994) 8 J Econ Pers 117. 
28 See Larouche, supra, note 24 at 388-393. 
29 This header does not concern mobile communications, where incumbency is much less of a problem.  
30 Supra, under I.A. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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business alike – are in any event not immediately targeted by newcomers and will 
thus remain with the incumbents. Furthermore, a policy decision was made early on to 
allow the incumbents to compete with others, even if under heavier regulation. Once 
the incumbent does not act like a sitting duck and seeks to retain its customers, the 
pace of decline of the incumbent’s market share is bound to be much slower (even if 
the incumbent were to behave entirely in line with competition law and regulation). 
 
The consequences of the resilience of incumbents are manifold. First of all, many 
newcomers could not establish themselves as they had foreseen; that as such is not a 
grave problem, since it is part of life that some business plans turn out to be flawed. 
Secondly, the continuing presence of a large player means that the whole industry is 
perhaps not as dynamic as it could be, since competitive forces do not play to their 
full extent. 
 
More fundamentally, the long-term presence of incumbents with overwhelming 
market shares – so that dominance is almost a foregone conclusion – casts a shadow 
not only over optimistic business plans, but also over the bases for regulatory policy. 
In short, what market structure can realistically be expected? So far, policymakers 
have often gone out from the assumption that over time, the telecommunication sector 
– more specifically fixed telecommunications – would become like any other sector of 
the industry. This assumption explicitly underpins the new electronic communications 
framework.
31 Accordingly, at some point a number of players of comparable strength 
will be competing with each other, thereby ensuring a certain amount of self-policing, 
so that competition law alone would suffice to keep the sector working efficiently. 
Regulatory intervention is thus meant to foster the emergence of this industry 
structure, and to vanish afterwards. The experience of the past years shows that this is 
unlikely to happen soon, and one has to question whether in fact any amount of 
regulatory intervention will lead to this ideal vision ever materializing. 
 
If the basic assumptions underlying regulation have to be put in question, a number of 
alternatives are possible: 
-  Relying instead on the theory of contestable markets as the underlying 
assumption, in order to roll back regulation despite the continuing presence of 
a single dominant player. Contestability, however, has not yet been firmly 
supported by empirical economic evidence;  
-  Accepting that the ideal competitive market will not occur and that sector-
specific regulation focusing on market power is bound to remain in place in 
the longer term; 
-  Pushing the analysis deeper and asking whether the failures observed in the 
telecommunications sector are truly resulting from dominance in the 
traditional sense or rather from other specific phenomena which are not 
necessarily linked with dominance in the traditional sense (e.g. bottlenecks, 
network effects). In the former case, we are back to the second alternative. In 
the latter case, there is room for a relaxing of regulation: after all, a number of 
                                                 
31 See for instance the opinion voiced by the Commission in Towards a new framework for Electronic 
Communications infrastructure and associated services  - The 1999 Communications Review 
COM(1999)539 (10 November 1999) at 49: “The aim is to create a regulatory regime which can be 
rolled back as competition strengthens, with the ultimate objective of controlling market power through 
the application of Community competition law.” The EP expressed a similar view in its Resolution of 
13 June 2000 [2001] OJ C 67/53 at 54. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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markets outside of telecommunications function properly  – under the 
supervision of competition law  – despite the presence of one or more 
dominant players. However, regulation with a narrow focus on the specific 
phenomena that were identified would remain in place.
32 As explained further 
below, recent developments seem to point towards this alternative.
33 
 
This discussion did not really take place in the last round of review, which resulted in 
the new EC electronic communications framework. Much like ONP 1998, the new 
framework appears lacking in terms of policy vision, a point discussed immediately 
below.
 34  
 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that incumbency often also acts as a 
burden on the incumbents. Their initial foreign investment plans also foresaw in the 
longer term that the revenue streams from outside would at least reach the same order 
of magnitude as those from the home countries themselves. Over time, the incumbent 
would thus emerge from its national confines to become a true global player. It now 
appears that few incumbents will ever reach that position. Rather, they are more likely 
to remain nationally-focussed firms with an international outlook. The long-term 
perspectives of the incumbent then become less attractive. From a public policy angle, 
this also implies a heightened risk of counter-productive “scorched-earth” defensive 
strategies on the part of the incumbents, which also points towards a persisting need 
for regulation in the long run. 
 
III.  THE LEGAL ASPECTS 
 
The previous discussion left aside the possible role of the legal and regulatory 
framework in the current difficulties of the industry. The main weaknesses of the 
former regulatory framework (ONP 1998) will now be surveyed to try to ascertain 
whether, and if so, how large a role they might have played in bringing about the 
downfall of the industry. 
 
A.  The lack of coherent vision in the “ONP 1998” framework 
 
In the 1990s, as ONP 1998 was being put together, the main objective was to 
introduce competition into the telecommunications sector.
35 There was a general 
consensus that competition offered a remedy to the main ills (inefficiency, lack of 
innovation, lack of customer focus), so much so that the link between competition and 
the desirable market outcome was often quickly assumed.
36 
 
As a consequence, to the extent that it can be said that ONP 1998 was based on any 
model, it was a fairly simple model of a competitive market where the incumbent 
                                                 
32 This hypothesis is discussed in greater detail in P. Larouche, “A closer look at some assumptions 
underlying EC regulation of electronic communications” (2002) 3 Journal of Network Industries 129. 
33 Infra, under III.B. 
34 Infra, under III.A. 
35 As the very title of the various directives making up ONP 1998, as listed supra, note 8, already 
indicates. 
36 See for instance recitals 3-7 of Directive 96/19, supra, note 8, where the Commission explains why it 
is requiring the complete liberalization of the sector. The reasoning is fairly quick, and it relies in great 
part on the general assumptions underlying the EC Treaty, which calls for a internal market without 
barriers to trade in services and restrictions of competition. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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would be facing newcomers, moving on with time to a  competitive market, as 
discussed previously. The task of the regulatory framework was then to make it 
possible for these newcomers to compete with the incumbent, ideally on equal terms. 
And so it purported to do: 
 
(i)  Directive 96/19 removed any remaining monopolies in the sector and 
Directive 97/13 sought to limit licensing requirements to a minimum, thereby 
making room for stand-alone (or facilities-based) competition throughout the 
sector. 
 
(ii)  Given that the provision of infrastructure (network capacity) in and of itself is 
liberalized, there is no need for incoming service providers to actually roll out 
their entire infrastructure. They can alternatively lease it from a network 
operator, be it the incumbent or a competitor. 
 
(iii)  Simply opening the market is generally agreed not to be sufficient, considering 
that newcomers cannot replicate the network of the incumbent at once, 
whether on their own or by renting capacity. Furthermore, network effects 
play against them. It is conceivable, but in an assymetrical setting unlikely, 
that the market players would enter into interconnection agreements on their 
own motion: such agreements enable newcomers to offer a comparable service 
and cancel out the network effects, but they bring few benefits to the 
incumbent at the outset. Hence it is sensible to introduce an interconnection 
regime whereby the incumbent can ultimately be forced to grant 
interconnection on its network. Directive 96/19 contained the seeds of such an 
interconnection regime, which was further elaborated in Directive 97/33. Since 
the incumbent is in a dominant position, this regime will enforce 
interconnection on transparent and non-discriminatory terms.
37 
 
A first problem arises here. In principle, all competitors, whether they rely on 
their own infrastructure or lease it and however large or small their network is, 
are asking for the same functionality; in line with a strict view of non-
discrimination, the only distinctions that can be made by the incumbent in its 
terms and conditions for interconnection should be based on objective factors 
such as the type of interconnection (over 1, 2 or more exchanges) or perhaps 
the volume of traffic generated.
38 Yet at the same time, from a public policy 
perspective, it might be desirable to “reward” newcomers who invest in 
infrastructure with more favourable interconnection rates. Directive 97/33 left 
some room for a break from non-discrimination along those lines, in the 
provisions concerning the reference interconnection offer.
39 
  
A second problem related to pricing. Given the dominance of the incumbent, it 
was determined that cost-based pricing should be enforced by regulation. Even 
if Directive 97/33 was not conclusive on this topic, the Commission later 
                                                 
37 Directive 97/33, supra, note 8, Art. 6. 
38 Although this has little impact on the underlying costs, given that each communication must be 
completed separately. 
39 Directive 97/33, supra, note 8, Art. 7(3). What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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encouraged the use of a FL-LRIC standard for cost assessment.
40 FL-LRIC is 
known for its general tendency to result in cost assessments in the low range, 
thereby leading to low regulated interconnection prices. 
 
(iv)  Finally, in view of the difficulties involved in duplicating local network 
infrastructure, unbundling of the local loop was also made compulsory with 
Regulation 2887/2000.
41 Here as well the unbundling regime is designed to 
make this an attractive option, with cost-oriented prices
42 preferrably 
determined according to a FL-LRIC method.
43 
 
When all of the competitive avenues listed above are put together, a picture emerges 
of a regulatory framework which seeks to make every competitive strategy possible,
44 
ranging from competing on the basis of one’s own infrastructure to merely reselling 
services obtained from another (usually the incumbent) at wholesale prices, with a 
number of variations and combinations in between. In the early stages of 
liberalization, this might not be such a bad policy course, in order to maximize the 
competitive pressure on the incumbent. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, it 
becomes clear that this course is self-contradictory: the easier it is to obtain 
infrastructure and services from the incumbent at low prices, the less competitors will 
be tempted to invest in their own infrastructure. Short-term strategies, centred on 
arbitrage between the incumbent’s wholesale and retail prices, will therefore tend to 
be favoured over longer-term strategies, where a firm would rely on an independent 




The phenomenon described above has been witnessed in the EU Member States since 
1998. Of course, Member States enjoy some discretion in the implementation of EC 
law, both because EC telecommunications law is couched in directives and because 
these directives themselves leave some leeway. For instance, as said above, Directive 
97/33 allowed Member States to introduce some differentiation in the interconnection 
regime, so as to favour newcomers who invest in their own infrastructure. A number 
of Member States (including France) chose to use that possibility and create a two-
tiered interconnection regime, but others chose not to do so and implement non-
discriminatory interconnection strictly.
46 This only added extra distortions to the 
market. 
 
                                                 
40 See Directive 97/33, ibid, Art. 7(2). FL-LRIC is envisaged at Recital 10 of Directive 97/33 and 
strongly advised in Recommendation 98/195 of 8 January 1998 on interconnection pricing [1998] OJ L 
73/42. See Larouche, supra, note 24 at 246-50. 
41 Regulation 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 [2000] OJ L 336/4. 
42 Ibid, Art. 3(3). 
43 Recommendation 2000/417 of 25 May 2000 [2000] OJ L 156/44, Art. 1(6). 
44 Not unlike what was attempted with the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 in the US as well. 
45 Compare the situation in fixed telecommunications, as outlined in the main text, with that of mobile 
communications, which ONP 1998 left by and large untouched. Most Member States took advantage of 
the reshuffling brought about by the introduction of second-generation technology (GSM) to move to a 
model of competition between networks (with of course additional service providers acting as 
resellers). As a result, competition in that part of the industry is fairly buoyant, both on price and on 
non-price aspects (features, billing, etc.). 
46 See Larouche, supra, note 24 at 76-85. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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With newcomers mostly adopting a short-term strategy, it comes as no surprise that 
they found themselves in a difficult position when the incumbent started to move its 
retail prices down under competitive pressure and squeezed their margins. This led to 
further regulatory action, usually through a downward revision of wholesale prices 
(for interconnection and/or unbundled local loop) in the course of regulatory or 
competition law proceedings.
47 While such action might be justified, one cannot 
escape the conclusion that the current competitors are very dependent on the 
regulatory framework for their survival. In other words, the shape of the market is 
essentially determined through regulatory decisions. In  the longer term, such a 
situation does not seem very desirable, or at the very least the regulatory framework 
must then rest on a consistent and well-articulated vision of where regulation should 
seek to lead the industry. 
 
In this respect, ONP 1998 falls too short: it focuses too much on competition as such, 
seeking to make every competitive avenue possible and forgetting in the process that 
competition is only a means to an end, i.e. an efficient and sustainable market. ONP 
1998 conceived regulation too much as a process of arbitrating between incumbents 
and newcomers, most often siding with the latter given their relative weakness. With 
time, the task of the regulatory authority must go beyond picking sides between 
incumbents and newcomers, especially as  the debate becomes less clear-cut. The 
authority must then in any event take a more pro-active posture and develop its own 
vision of where it is heading, if it is to discharge its task adequately. Such vision 
should preferrably be distilled out of the legislative mandate of the authority, but in 
any event the authority should work on it. Given the inherent uncertainty which 
prevails in a rapidly evolving industry like telecommunications, the regulatory vision 
cannot and should not be framed in terms of a clear market structure, i.e. a given 
number of players for a given number of services working with a given number of 
platforms and technologies. Rather, there should be a consistent regulatory message 
running through the various actions of the authority, such as a priority given to 
innovation, to lower prices, to the rapid introduction of new technologies or to a 
secure investment climate, to name but a few possibilities. 
 
The new framework for electronic communications does not bring much improvement 
in this respect. On the positive side, Directive 2002/21 contains a fairly well 
developed statement of regulatory objectives,
48 which Member States must assign to 
their national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The NRAs will therefore receive 
guidance from their enabling legislation. The list of objectives found in Directive 
2002/21, however, looks more like a catalogue than a coherent statement. For 
instance, NRAs “shall promote competition” by “ensuring that users… derive 
maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality”, “ensuring that there is no 
distortion or restriction of competition” and also “encouraging efficient investment 
and promoting innovation”. These various goals, as was seen before in the discussion 
of the ONP 1998 framework, are not necessarily compatible, so that the new 
electronic communications framework leaves the door open to a continuation of the 
                                                 
47 See for instance the proceedings under Article 82 EC against FT and DT relating to various squeeze 
tactics on the local access market: “Commission fines DT for charging anti-competitive tariffs for 
access to its local networks” IP/03/717 (21 May 2003) and “High-speed Internet: the Commission 
imposes a fine on Wanadoo for abuse of a dominant position” IP/03/1025 (16 July 2003). 
48 Directive 2002/21, supra, note 2, Art. 8. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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current policy contradictions.
 49 At the very least, it leaves the possibility that Member 
States would opt for differing and potentially diverging policy orientations. 
Furthermore, the relative “agnosticism” of the new framework is to be contrasted with 
the clear and repeated intent of the European Council, as stated in the conclusions of 
its spring meetings since the Lisbon Summit of 2000, to make Europe “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”.
50 Normally, such 
a statement of intent should find its echo in the new framework, for instance through a 
signal that priority is to be given to innovation and access to communications. Rather, 
on the face of the new framework, it would be up to the NRAs to heed the conclusions 
of the European Council when implementing a rather undecisive body of EC 
secondary law. 
 
B.  The significance of the conceptual architecture 
 
Another major weakness of ONP 1998 was its conceptual architecture, which was 
very technically-oriented. By way of example, few observers will lament the demise 
of the definition of “public voice telephony”, which was used prior to 1998 in order to 
delineate the scope of the allowable monopoly rights and kept a central role in ONP 
1998.
51 It took years to reach a workable understanding of that concept.
52 ONP 1998 
is rife with technical concepts and distinctions between “networks” and “services”, 
“fixed” and “mobile” communications, “access” and “interconnection”, etc. 
 
In all fairness, it must be pointed out that “significant market power” (SMP), one of 
the central concepts of ONP 1998,
53 was meant to be a non-technical concept, 
referring instead to the economic notion of m arket power. The outcome of the 
discussions held ahead of the legislative process leading to ONP 1998 shows that the 
institutions agreed that the imposition of assymetric regulation would be done on the 
basis of economic analysis, as opposed to incumbency or technical factors.
54 This 
legislative intent was stifled, however, by the inclusion of a rule-of-thumb in the 
actual definition of SMP, whereby an operator with a share 25% or more of the 
market to be studied would be presumed to have SMP.
55 Even if ONP 1998 expressly 
                                                 
49 The same cataloguing of potentially contradictory objectives can be observed elsewhere as well, for 
instance in the considerations to be taken into account when ordering that SMP opeators provide access 
to their competitors of when introducing price control and cost accounting obligations for SMP 
operators: see Directive 2002/19, supra, note 2, Art. 12 and 13 respectively. 
50 See the conclusions of the Lisbon Council (23-24 March 2000), para. 5, reiterated in Stockholm (23-
24 March 2001), Barcelona (15-16 March 2002) and Brussels (20-21 March 2003).  
51 See its use in Directive 90/388 (as amended by Directive 96/19), Directive 97/33 and Directive 
98/10, supra, note 8. 
52 It took the Commission several pages to set out that understanding: see the Communication of 20 
October 1995 on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388 [1995] OJ C 275/2 at 4-8 and 
Larouche, supra, note 24 at 9-14. 
53 The SMP concept remains key in the new electronic communications framework, as will be seen 
below, but its content has been changed radically. 
54 See the  Communication on Present Status and Future Approach for Open Access to 
Telecommunications Networks and Services (ONP), COM(94)513 final (29 November 1994) and the 
Council Resolution of 18 September 1995 on the implementation of the future regulatory framework 
for telecommunications [1995] OJ C 258/1 under 3.c). 
55 See Directive 97/33, supra, note 8, Art. 4(3). The same definition was later taken over in Directive 
97/51 (amending Directive 92/44 at Art. 2(3)) and Directive 98/10, ibid., Art. 2(2)(i). What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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The conceptual architecture of ONP 1998 was criticized along the following lines: 
(i)  Lack of flexibility: Too many details were settled in  the EC directives 
themselves and could not easily be modified. For instance, the various 
directives making up ONP 1998 defined the markets to be studied in the SMP 
procedure, and also indicated precisely the remedies to be imposed on SMP 
operators. It was difficult for NRAs to deviate from these provisions on their 
own motion.
57 
(ii)  Formalism: The inquiries mandated by ONP 1998 did not always match 
reality. Markets were defined without paying attention to the actual 
functioning of the sector. To name but one, the “interconnection market” that 
had to be studied pursuant to Directive 97/33 was a fairly artificial construct, 
to say the least.
58 Similarly, because the 25% rule-of-thumb just discussed, 
SMP assessment became a relatively formalistic exercise. 
(iii)  Lack of legal certainty: It may seem paradoxical to argue that ONP 1998 is 
also deficient as regards legal certainty, if it is otherwise inflexible and formal. 
Many market players nonetheless did, on the grounds that ONP 1998 allowed 
for too much divergence in the respective national implementations, so that it 
was difficult to foresee in which direction the NRA in a given Member State 
would be heading. 
 
The above grievances were certainly justified, and it can be ventured without too 
much doubt that the conceptual architecture of ONP 1998 hampered the realization of 
its objectives. It did not take too long for this regulatory framework to appear outdated 
or at least unable to cope with upcoming developments. 
 
Here as well, it is interesting to see if the conceptual architecture of the new electronic 
communications framework marks an improvement over ONP 1998. As is by now 
well known, the problems described above were addressed mostly by aligning the 
substance of the new regulatory framework with that of EC competition law.
59 The 
theory is that competition law concepts are inherently flexible and allow for a better 
fit with reality (based as they are on economic analysis); furthermore, given the 
accumulation of case-law over the years, these general concepts have by now been 
sufficiently well mapped to provide legal certainty to the parties concerned. As a 
consequence, the revamped SMP procedure under the electronic communications 
framework relies heavily on competition law concepts: 
                                                 
56 To their discharge, it must be said that in most cases, especially as regards fixed telecommunications, 
the outcome of the inquiry was quite clear, even without in-depth analysis. 
57 As the ECJ pointed out in its judgment of 13 December 2001, Case C-79/00, Telefónica de España v. 
Administracíon General del Estado [2001] ECJ I -10075 at para. 29, Directive 97/33 is not a full 
harmonization directive, and Member States are free to be more severe with SMP operators, provided 
that they do not contradict EC law in so doing. The argument is probably valid for the other ONP 1998 
directives as well. Accordingly, on the assumption that national law enabled NRAs to go beyond what 
was provided for in ONP 1998 and provided the NRA action did not otherwise contradict EC law, 
NRAs could for instance assess SMP in markets other than those defined in EC legislation.  
58 Directive 97/33, supra, note 8, Art. 7(2). See the Commission Communication “Determination of 
Organisations with Significant Market Power (SMP) for implementation of the ONP Directives” (1 
March 1999), available at <http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/comm-en.htm>. 
59 See Larouche, supra, note 32. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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-  It is divided in three stages, market definition, market analysis and remedies, 
in line with the main steps of competition law proceedings;
60 
-  At the market definition stage, NRAs are meant to follow competition law 
methodology.
61 In practice, the Commission takes a leading role with its 
Recommendation on relevant product and service markets, which the NRAs 
are expected to follow.
62 
-  Market analysis comes down to assessing whether one or more players have 
SMP on the relevant market. In the new framework, SMP is defined as “a 
position equivalent to dominance”,
63 and the Commission Guidelines 
emphasize further the link with competition law.
64 
-  A less obvious but no less consequential link is made at the remedies stage, 
where the NRA enjoys a choice among a set of remedies that all bear close 
resemblance to what could be imposed under competition law.
65 Little room 
has been left for more “sector-specific” remedies where changes would be 




At the same time, it must be acknowledged that competition law cannot solve every 
regulatory problem. The track record of competition law analysis on bottleneck-type 
problems, for instance, remains modest: both the “essential facilities doctrine” and the 
approach based on a “market for access to facilities”
67 appear very contrived and have 
not produced outstanding results so far.
68  
 
It is equally mistaken to believe that regulation founded on solid economic analysis is 
only possible within the framework of competition law. Competition law is but one 
way of using economic analysis for regulatory purposes. 
                                                 
60 Directive 2002/21. supra, note 2, Art. 15-16. 
61 Ibid, Art. 15(3). See the Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant 
market power [2002] OJ C 165/6 at para. 33ff. 
62 Ibid, Art. 15(1). See the first recommendation, Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 
[2003] OJ L 114/45. The binding effect on the NRAs arises out of the procedure of Art. 7 of Directive 
2002/21, which gives the Commission the power to block NRA decisions if the NRA plans to stray 
from the Recommendation and the Commission finds that this could infringe EC law. 
63 Ibid., Art. 14(2). 
64 Commission Guidelines, supra, note 61 at para. 70ff. 
65 See under Directive 2002/19, supra, note 2, for the wholesale level, Art. 9 (transparency), 10 (non-
discrimination), 11 (accounting separation), 12 (access to facilities) and 13 (price control and 
accounting) and under Directive 2002/22, supra, note 2, for the retail level, Art. 17 (pricing obligations, 
non-discrimination, unbundling). 
66 For instance, in the current discussion surrounding allegedly excessive prices for call termination on 
mobile networks, all signs point towards the imposition of the heaviest possible regulatory remedy, 
namely price control (to be covered by Directive 2002/19, ibid, Art. 13, in cases decided under the new 
framework). Such regulatory intervention is likely to beget further intervention (or collusive behaviour) 
to offset its impact. At the same time, it could have been possible at limited cost to change the 
technological model underlying mobile communications by making subscribers “visible” to competing 
networks for the purposes of call termination, thereby introducing an element of competition without 
interfering too deeply with the freedom of firms to plan their business. This type of remedy, however, 
does not fit within the idealized competition-law-type remedies of Directive 2002/19. 
67 This was the approach put forward by the Commission in the Notice of 22 August 1998 on the 
application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector [1998] OJ C 
265/2 in order to avoid using the essential facilities doctrine, which was already facing criticism. 
68 The essential facilities doctrine was put in an evidentiary straitjacket by the ECJ in its judgment of 26 
November 1998, Case C -7/97,  Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.  Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG [1998] ECJ I-7791. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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Indeed, now that the new framework for electronic communications must be 
operationalized, it is already moving away from complete alignment with competition 
law towards a more original form of economic analysis. The Commission 
Recommendation on the Relevant Product and Services Markets illustrates this point 
very well.
69 The three-step model outlined above (market definition, analysis and 
remedies) sticks very closely to competition law, but it hides one important step 
which lies at the core of the Recommendation, namely “market selection”. In other 
words, it is not sufficient simply to define a market and find a dominant position for 
intervention to be justified, whether ex ante or ex post. In competition policy, the 
triggering factor is to be found in specific conduct (abuse) or a change in market 
structure (merger). In the new regulatory framework, this triggering factor comes at 
this “market selection” stage, where some relevant markets are singled out for the 
SMP procedure. In its Recommendation, the Commission sets out three conditions for 
a market to be selected:
70 
-  the presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers whether of structural, 
legal or regulatory nature; 
-  a market structure which does not tend towards effective competition within 
the relevant time horizon; and  
-  inadequacy of competition law alone to address the market failure(s) 
concerned. 
Furthermore, when elaborating on the first condition, the Commission adds that 
persistent entry barriers of a structural nature arise because of (i) a combination of 
economies of scale/scope and high sunk costs or (ii) the need to obtain a network 
component that cannot technically or economically be duplicated ( bottleneck).
71 
These two phenomenons are typical of telecommunications, as a specific form of 
network industry.
72 The Commission Recommendation testifies to an original 
approach which takes into account the specific economic realities of the sector while 
paying lip-service to the principle of alignment with competition law.  
 
With the new SMP procedure as it is now unfolding, the new electronic 
communications framework is therefore already moving from a quasi-ideological 
principle of alignment with competition law towards a more sector-specific analytical 
method relying on economic and functional criteria, which appears to be the optimal 
conceptual architecture. If this approach retains currency, then it could also signal a 
shift in the underlying regulatory assumptions away from the ideal of the perfect 
competitive market policed with competition law, and towards the long-term presence 
of well-targeted regulation alongside competition law.
73 
 
                                                 
69 Supra, note 62. 
70 Ibid, recital 9. 
71 In my view, the Commission could have added to the list the presence of network effects which tilt 
the balance against new entrants, although in most cases these network effects will be coupled with 
economies of scale/scope and sunk costs. By the same token, it is quite likely that the bottleneck cases 
will also be cases where economies of scale/scope are coupled with high sunk costs, save where 
technical reasons render duplication impossible. On the other hand, “bottlenecks” and “network 
effects” are more precise categories than “economies of scale/scope coupled with high sunk costs”, 
which do not necessarily distinguish telecommunications from other parts of the economy. 
72 See the comparison between different network industries in the Green Paper on Services of General 
Interest, COM(2003)270 (21 May 2003) at para. 70-2 and para. 29-33 of the Annex. 
73 See supra under II.D. What went wrong: the European perspective    Pierre Larouche 
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C.  The lack of self-enforcement incentives 
 
It was pointed out in the companion paper on the US perspective that the US 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 contained a regulatory bargain that was meant to 
convince the players who would bear most of the burden of new regulation, namely 
the Baby Bells, to make efforts to comply with it. In short, in return for their 
compliance with a regulatory check-list designed to ensure that competitors can enter 
local markets, the Baby Bells could request permission from the FCC to enter the 
long-distance market within their respective areas o f local operations.
74 This 
regulatory bargain apparently became far less attractive when the long-distance 
market lost much of its appeal, having been reduced to a commodity market, but at 
least it was built in the new legislation. 
 
There was no comparable  trade-off built in ONP 1998. Of course, the respective 
incumbents could envisage expanding in other Member States in order to offset the 
impact of liberalization in their home territory, as outlined previously. This was 
however more of a readily available competitive strategy resulting from ONP 1998 
than an explicit component thereof. Furthermore, it is in the nature of a regime based 
on directives, such as ONP 1998, that implementation will result in some legitimate 
divergences between Member States (leaving aside cases of incomplete or incorrect 
implementation, which are bound to arise as well). Accordingly, even if there had 
been a regulatory bargain at EC level, it could not have been a very attractive one, 
given the uncertainty introduced by the implementation process. 
 
Consequently, ONP 1998 depended entirely for its success on proper “exogenous” 
enforcement, coming from public authorities. At Member State level, the resolve of 
public authorities was undermined by inherent conflicts of interest. While the NRA 
(with the support of the national competition authority (NCA) and national courts) 
might have desired to apply and enforce ONP 1998 adequately, other parts of the 
State were probably less inclined to do so. The latter include the department holding 
the State interest in the incumbent (still present in most Member States) and even the 
central political authority, since in many Member States the incumbent’s shares are 
widely held and any downturn in the incumbent’s fortunes is bound to be felt by a 
large swathe of individual shareholders. 
 
In the end, only the EC itself stood firm behind its own regulatory framework, with 
the Commission as the main enforcing authority against reluctant Member States (via 
infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC) and even directly against firms (via 
competition law).
75 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to assess whether 
enforcement was defective. When assessed against the deadlines set in the various 
instruments making up ONP 1998, the compliance record of Member States and firms 
lies below reasonable expectations: even when the formal implementation deadlines 
were met, there often remained problems in substance. For one, in most Member 
States it took a number of years to agree and put in place an accounting system and 
costing standards which allowed for interconnection pricing to be assessed in line 
with Directive 97/33. Another example is the unbundling of the local loop, where the 
                                                 
74 See the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 USC § 271. 
75 The overlap between ONP 1998 and EC competition law, both in substance and institutionally, are 
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Commission began with a softer measure, a Recommendation.
76 In view of the lack of 
movement on the part of Member States, the Commission then moved to have a 
Regulation adopted.
77 Even then, two years later, the situation is still unsatisfactory.
78 
 
At the same time, in the absence of a regulatory bargain which could entice self-
compliance and in view of conflicts of interest at Member State level, it is part and 
parcel of the regulatory process that compliance deadlines bordering on the unrealistic 
would be set, in order to increase pressure on the various actors. If the deadlines are 
left aside, the compliance record is less disappointing. Considering that a mere six 
years elapsed since the main components of ONP 1998 were adopted, progress is 
impressive, especially when one considers that often the only incentive for 
compliance was the threat of action from the Commission. 
 
Accordingly, it is difficult to blame the problems of the sector on a large-scale failure 
to ensure substantive compliance with ONP 1998 according to the set deadlines. 
However, ONP 1998 could perhaps have been better designed to create more 
incentives for compliance than the mere threat of enforcement measures. 
 
The new electronic communications framework arrives in a different context. Over 
the years, resistance at Member State level has abated somewhat. Since the  new 
framework does not require any further major policy shifts (liberalization being 
“acquired” at the policy and legal level), it can be expected that enforcement at 
Member State level will be more forthcoming. Furthermore, the new framework gives 
NRAs more discretion at the remedial stage, and the heaviest remedies (access, price 
control) allow for a careful balancing of interests between the various parties 
involved, so that everyone can be put in a winning position.
79 It is therefore quite 
conceivable that compliance will be ensured more smoothly than under ONP 1998. 
 
D.  Losing sight of the Internal Market  
 
Within EC law, ONP 1998 constitutes an interesting and rare example of 
harmonization
80 driven not so much by the need to realize the Internal Market as by 
the will to introduce or strengthen competition in the harmonized field.
81 ONP 1998 
suffered from significant shortcomings with respect to the Internal Market. 
 
The UMTS experiment, discussed previously, highlights these shortcomings. 
Relevant EC law can be found in Decision 128/1999, which obliged Member States to 
issue UMTS licenses within a coordinated timeframe, for harmonized frequency 
                                                 
76 Recommendation 2000/417, supra, note 43. 
77 Regulation 2887/2000, supra, note 41. 
78 See the 8
th Implementation Report, supra, note 3 at 24-32 
79 See the list of relevant factors for consideration listed in Directive 2002/19, supra, note 2, at Art. 
12(2) as regards access obligations and Art. 13(1) and (2) as regards price control and accounting 
obligations. 
80 With instruments based on Article 95 EC. 
81 At a glance, one could argue that this was bound to follow from the parallel use of Articles 86 and 95 
EC as legal bases, the first one giving an unmistakable bent in the direction of competition as opposed 
to the internal market. However, it is argued in Larouche, supra, note 24 at 37-70 that the difference 
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bands and according to agreed standards.
82 Beyond that, Directive 97/13 imposed few 
constraints on the freedom of Member States to choose the assignment method.
83 
 
At the time, it was widely believed in the industry that UMTS was the key to future 
growth, and accordingly that a UMTS license was essential; without one, a mobile 
communications firm would more or less be left to manage its decline. Moreover, in 
most Member States, licenses were issued under the following conditions: all of the 
available frequencies were assigned at once (now-or-never), and license holders 
would not be allowed to share their networks or to engage into secondary trading of 
their licenses. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the British and 
German auctions led to such high bids. 
 
But there is also a European dimension to the story. The main players involved in the 
licensing  procedure tended to be the same from one Member State to the other 
(whether alone or with local partners): Vodafone, Orange, T-Mobile, BT (now O2), 
and to a lesser extent Telefoníca and Telecom Italia. These firms were pursuing pan-
European strategies and were seeking a license in each Member State, or at least in 
each major one. Similarly, the equipment manufacturers operate on a pan-European 
basis, given standardization. A large number of customers also desire true pan-
European services (as opposed to merely national services with roaming). Yet the 
licensing procedures remained fundamentally national. Accordingly, when a large 
country such as the UK went first, it can be ventured that all the main players entered 
very high bids since they knew that their pan-European plans hinged on obtaining a 
license in the UK. Then came the largest country, Germany, which was also crucial. 
Here as well bids went very high. Afterwards, the pan-European plans of players who 
failed in the UK and Germany were shattered. One could suggest that this led to a loss 
of interest in subsequent licensing procedures, or at least to a revision of valuation 
models for the losing players.  
 
It is striking that only the public authorities adopted a national perspective, while the 
operators, the equipment vendors and a significant part of the customers took a pan-
European view. The authorities therefore helped to perpetuate the division of the 
Internal Market into national markets at a time when other actors were moving in the 
opposite direction. There should have been a more efficient way to reflect this pan-
European view in the UMTS licensing procedures. The total amount spent on UMTS 
licenses might not have been much different, but the procedure might have delivered a 
more efficient outcome. 
 
The UMTS experiment demonstrates once more that the outcome of ONP 1998 was a 
set of 18 liberalized markets
84 and not a single market in telecommunications. The 
national divisions in European telecommunications are far more entrenched than local 
or regional divisions in the US.
85 Member States are also very adamant about their 
                                                 
82 Decision 128/1999, supra, note 14, Art. 3. 
83 Directive 97/13,  supra, note 8, Art. 10-11.  Essentially, Member States had to respect basic 
procedural rights and conduct the assignment in an objective, non-discriminatory, detailed, transparent 
and proportionate fashion. 
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the end of the 19
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competence to police their respective telecommunications markets. EC 
telecommunications policy should attempt to counteract these centrifugal tendencies, 
which can give rise to suboptimal outcomes
86 and tend to be self-perpetuating.
87 
 
ONP 1998 suffered from major gaps with respect to the internal market: 
-  In the run-up to Directive 97/13 on licensing, the Commission abandoned its 
hopes of introducing a single-license regime
88 and instead settled for a regime 
where each Member State would remain competent to require and issue 
licenses for firms operating on its territory. Directive 97/13 was meant to 
foster the internal market by preventing Member States from extending 
licensing requirements beyond what is strictly necessary, but it was not very 
successful in this respect.
89 Furthermore, the one-stop-shopping procedure 
provided for in Directive 97/13 was never put in practice.
90 
-  ONP 1998 did not achieve much either as regards the management of scarce 
resources (frequencies, numbers) in the light of the internal market. Any 
suggestions of a European-level management system were promptly 
dismissed. At the very least, one would have expected some coordination 
framework to ensure that the actions of national authorities do not affect the 
functioning of the internal market. Instead, the practice of limited  ad hoc 
coordination continued (with the results discussed above in the case of 
UMTS). 
The shortcomings of ONP 1998 as regards the internal market are all the more glaring 
when telecommunications is compared with neighbouring sectors, such as television 
broadcasting or e -commerce, where the EC managed to introduce a harmonized 
regulatory framework based on home-country control and mutual recognition.
91 Seen 
in that light, it becomes difficult to understand why ONP 1998 did not realize the 
internal market objectives better. Furthermore, the close proximity of the three areas 
covered by ONP 1998 (telecommunications services and networks), Directive 89/552 
(broadcasting) and Directive 2000/31 (so-called “Information Society services”) gives 
                                                                                                                                            
international communications remained structured on a national scale. Following the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the natural trend towards concentration at national level has re-
appeared, through mergers between RBOCs (from seven to only three now) and expansion into other 
regions.  
86 For instance, the failure to satisfy demand from the class of customers which is more pan-European 
than nationally oriented, or the failure to achieve economies of scale and scope in network operation 
and service provision. 
87 As mentioned supra, under II.D., given that the starting point is a set of national markets, each of 
which is mostly in the hands of respective incumbent, there is a fair chance that the incumbent will not 
immediately succeed in rebalancing its operations away from its home base, with the attendant risk of 
defensive strategies on the home market. 
88 Where firms could operate throughout the internal market on the basis of a single license. That 
license could be issued either at the European level (a very unpopular option) or at national level, with 
a home-country control and mutual recognition system. 
89 While Art. 7(1) of Directive 97/13, supra, note 8, was a fairly good provision which limited the 
ambit of individual licenses to the cases where they were indeed necessary, i t was unfortunately 
combined with Art. 7(2), which allowed Member States to require individual licenses for the provision 
of public networks and publicly available services. As a consequence of Art. 7(2), almost every 
newcomer had to obtain a license, since from a business perspective it is hardly sustainable to enter the 
market while avoiding to provide public networks and publicly available services (as defined in ONP 
1998). Article 7(2) deprives 7(1) of any restrictive effect. See Larouche, supra, note 24 at 86-89. 
90 Directive 97/13, ibid., Art. 13. 
91 See Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 (Television Without Frontiers) [1989] OJ L 298/23 and 
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rise to practical conflicts, however careful the EC was in avoiding overlap in its 
definitional constructions. Firms active in all of these areas might have to operate 
under a home-country control framework for part of their business (broadcasting and 
e-commerce) and a country-by-country framework for another part 
(telecommunications).  
 
By the way, it is noteworthy that even within the law itself, strong centrifugal forces 
were at work which ONP 1998 could not overcome. Of course, ONP 1998 is part of 
EC law, and it is a harmonized framework applicable throughout the EU. 
Nevertheless, as soon as ONP 1998 was adopted, telecommunications law became 
national again. The national implementations did nothing to enhance the European 
dimension of telecommunications law, quite to the contrary. They served as screens, 
so that already in 1998 one spoke not so much of European, but rather of French, UK, 
German, etc. telecommunications law. Further developments at Member State level, 
through ancillary enactments, regulatory decision-making or case law, seemed to pay 
only limited attention to the European dimension of telecommunications law. 
 
The new electronic communications framework should alleviate that last problem. 
Through Commission recommendations and guidelines in the SMP procedure,
92 the 
EC remains involved in the day-to-day activities of NRAs. Furthermore, with the 
consultation and review mechanism set up in Directive 2002/21,
93 NRAs will be more 
inclined to pay attention to developments in other Member States. Chances are that 
the work of European regulator fori such as the IRG and the new ERG will gain in 
significance. 
 
With respect to the internal market in telecommunications, the new framework marks 
a progress, but there is still some way to go. The policy line of Directive 97/13 for 
licensing (no home-country approach but rather a limitation of the use of individual 
licenses) is followed and brought one step further: Directive 2002/20 eliminates 
individual licenses altogether, but leaves open the possibility of requiring operators to 
obtain “rights of use” for scarce resources.
94 Nevertheless, market players will 
continue to have to devote resources to complying with the regulatory framework of 
every Member State where they operate, even if the compliance burden is becoming 
lighter. As for scarce resources, the new framework also compels Member States to 
pay more attention to the European dimension.
95 Moreover, the seeds of a European 
spectrum policy are sown with the Radio Spectrum Decision.
96 
 
E.  Institutional quagmire 
 
The institutional structure of ONP 1998 was never simple, and it was probably never 
meant to be simple: 
                                                 
92 See supra, notes 61 and 62. 
93 Directive 2002/21, supra, note 2, Art. 7. This mechanism provides that each NRA must send its 
decisions concerning SMP in draft form to the Commission and the other NRAs, which can then 
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(market definition deviating from the Commission Recommendation, designation of SMP operators), 
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-  The main institution under ONP 1998 was the National Regulatory Authority 
(NRA).
97 Under ONP 1998, the NRA accomplished a number of specific 
tasks, listed in Directives 92/44, 97/13, 97/33 and 98/10. These tasks are 
usually defined in a narrow fashion. National courts also had a role to play 
with the judicial review of NRA decisions. 
-  At the same time, the various competition authorities, namely the 
Commission, NCAs and national courts – whether applying EC or national 
competition law  – retained their powers under competition law. Given the 
substantive overlap between ONP 1998 and competition law,
98 these 
authorities could also intervene in most regulatory disputes between market 
players. 
Here as well, such a multitude of authorities can be useful at the outset to put pressure 
on the incumbent. Newcomers and other interested parties can then choose what they 
think is the most appropriate forum for their claims against the incumbent. 
 
In the long run, however, the downsides of such a structure are likely to prevail. First 
of all, the various authorities might hold diverging views on certain issues, which can 
lead to policy impasses. Secondly, given the financial and commercial interests at 
stake, it is a safe bet that almost every dispute will be litigated extensively. In that 
case, the availability of many parallel avenues for litigation can drive dispute costs 
beyond an acceptable level. 
 
In addition to these structural difficulties, the implementation of the institutional part 
of ONP 1998 was not always optimal, in particular as regards the NRA. On its face, 
ONP 1998 does not contain much on the NRA setup: it requires independence from 
the market players as well as structural separation within the administration when the 
State otherwise holds a significant participation in the incumbent.
99 It has taken some 
time for the Commission to be satisfied that all Member States respected these two 
requirements: separation from the rest of the State administration (when applicable), 
in particular, proved difficult.
100 
 
Beyond compliance with the explicit requirements of Directive 90/387, however, 
there were other points where the institutional implications of ONP 1998 were not 
always fully drawn. First of all, even though ONP 1998 only assigns a series of small 
tasks to the NRA, it will not work properly if the NRA is not broadly and solidly 
established as the point of reference for regulation of the telecommunications sector, 
with the requisite powers. In the Anglo-American administrative law tradition, the 
NRA could without too many difficulties be given a strong position.
101 On the 
Continent, a number of national legal systems do not readily admit that independent 
authorities be given broad discretionary powers, usually for reasons of a constitutional 
                                                 
97 According to Directive 90/387, supra, note 8, Art. 5a(1) (as added by Directive 97/51), the tasks 
assigned to the NRA under ONP 1998 could be entrusted to more than one body. Most Member States 
chose to leave them with a single body. 
98 Supra, note 75. 
99 Directive 90/387 (as amended by Directive 97/51), supra, note 8, Art. 5a(2). 
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order, namely the primacy of politics (i.e. the principle that major decisions must be 
made by, or under the responsibility of, elected officials). The implementation of ONP 
1998 left the NRA with a patchwork of limited competences, giving rise to challenges 
to NRA decisions that centred on competence issues rather than going to the merits of 
the case. Secondly, it was seen above that the thrust of ONP 1998, in theory at least, 
was to introduce economic analysis in the regulatory process, certainly for SMP 
assessment. The 25% rule-of-thumb included in the definition of SMP might have 
proven too attractive and hampered deeper economic analysis, but at the same time 
the fact that the 25% rule-of-thumb acquired such pre-eminence also shows that the 
NRAs were sometimes lacking in their capacity to conduct in-depth economic 
analysis. 
 
In the end, the institutional structure of ONP 1998 did not help to correct the 
substantive flaws pointed out earlier; quite to the contrary, it tended to exacerbate 
them, since there was no strong and able voice at the application and enforcement 
stage which could try to make up for the weakness of the underlying legislation. 
 
Once more, it is interesting to see whether the new electronic communications 
framework addressed these issues. On the institutional side, the two main elements of 
the new framework are a strengthening of the position of the NRA, coupled with 
closer control on how the NRA exercises its powers. As regards the first element, the 
NRA is given a central place in the Framework Directive, with new provisions 
concerning transparency,





106 etc. What is more, the policy objectives of the NRA are 
clearly set out, and Member States are required to “ensure that… [NRAs] take all 
reasonable measures which are aimed at achieving [these] objectives”.
107 It would be 
inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Framework Directive if the NRA 
continued to be entrusted only with limited competences. Rather, the NRA must 
receive a sufficiently strong and broad mandate from the legislature, so that it can 
carry out its duties without fear of constant litigation on its competence. The new 
framework will not lead to the perceived excesses of the FCC, which is often 
criticized for being out-of-tune with politics, if not out-of-control. Whereas the FCC’s 
mandate very often only refers to the “public interest”, the provisions of the 
Framework Directive and of the other directives contain much more detail on how the 
NRA is meant to exercise its powers (procedure, consultation, principles to be 
followed, elements to be considered). In the end, it will always be possible to conduct 
judicial review on the merits with a sufficient amount of legislative guidance as to 
what should be reviewed. 
 
As regards the second element, the NRA is subject to closer control. First of all, the 
Commission exerts some form of control on the substance of the work of the NRAs. It 
can in effect tell the NRAs what to do through the Recommendation on the relevant 
market
108 and the Guidelines on market definition and SMP analysis.
109 Secondly, the 
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Commission also controls the individual actions of the NRAs in the SMP procedure 
through the review mechanism of the Framework Directive.
110 Thirdly, NRA 
decisions must be appealable to national courts.
111 Fourthly, the NRA must cooperate 
and coordinate its actions with those of the NCA.
112 Fifthly, the NRA is also required 
to work with its counterparts in other Member States.
113 All in all, the NRAs are 
encouraged to behave as if they were part of a greater group of European economic 
regulators, with the Commission, NCAs and other NRAs. This adds a new dimension 
to the duties of national administrative authorities under EC law:
114 whereas 
previously they could be content with keeping an eye on the Commission, they now 
have to pay attention to what is happening in other authorities and in other Member 
States as well. 
 
In the light of these changes, it can be concluded the complex institutional structure of 
telecommunications regulation has not been simplified: the multiple authorities 
remain active in the sector, without their competence being curtailed. However, the 
lines are more clearly drawn, in that the NRA is supposed to play the leading role. At 
the same time, this should contribute to overcoming the resistance of some 
Continental systems to making the NRA a broad-based regulatory authority. As for 
the competence of NRAs to carry out complex economic analysis, however, the 
tighter control mechanisms might prevent mishaps and lapses, but they provide no 
guarantee that the NRAs in general will improve their performance in this respect. It 
must be said, however, that the kind of economic analysis required under 
telecommunications regulation is particularly difficult for any authority  – under 
competition law or regulation – to organize and carry out. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of this survey of the less glamorous aspects of the recent past in European 
telecommunications, it remains to be seen whether the various shortcomings or 
outright failures identified above played a determinant role in the current situation of 
the European telecommunications industry. 
 
The assessment of causality is always rife with difficulties. Of course, if none of the 
mistakes discussed above had been made, European telecommunications would in all 
likelihood be in a  better position now. But this does not suffice to warrant 
apportioning the blame on all of them. 
 
Overall, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the European 
telecommunications industry in great part dug its own grave. The industry made so 
many assumptions which in hindsight seem overoptimistic. This paper discussed only 
the more specifically European miscalculations, among which the UMTS experiment 
ranks first by a margin. If the industry had spent say € 30 billion instead of over € 100 
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billion on these licenses, the current situation would be drastically different, all other 
things being equal. The deeper causes of overspending on UMTS lie of course in part 
on regulatory faults, as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, the industry had on its very 
own inflated the prospects of the technology, assumed the demand would simply 
appear by virtue of technological progress alone, and ignored the bottom-line by 
looking at turnover only and forgotting costs.
115 Other aggravating factors in Europe, 
besides UMTS, include misinformed international strategies by the incumbents in the 
early years of liberalization, a supply-side approach to technology and the unplanned 
for (but not unforeseeable) resilience of incumbents. 
 
Viewed against this background, it is doubtful that the many flaws of ONP 1998 – 
including a lack of coherent vision, a rigid conceptual architecture, excessive reliance 
on hard-headed enforcement to ensure compliance, neglect of the internal market and 
institutional confusion – in and of themselves played a significant role in bringing 
down the industry.  
 
All the darker spots in ONP 1998 certainly did not help, however, which is why it 
should be expected that the new electronic communications framework would remedy 
or at least alleviate them. As was seen above, the outcome is mitigated: there is some 
progress, but the quality of the regulatory framework can still be improved. 
 
In the end, however, it must not be forgotten that while the European 
telecommunications industry suffered a significant downturn, the overall results of the 
first few years of liberalization have not been negative for everyone: the customers 
have generally benefitted from the course of events, and the policymakers have – 
leaving aside design flaws in the legal framework, which should not detract from the 
underlying policy – seen their choices in significant part vindicated. It remains to be 
seen whether the same can still be said in another five years. 
 
 
                                                 
115 As mentioned at the outset, a number of these problems w ere not specific to European 
telecommunications and were already discussed in the companion piece on the US perspective, supra, 
note 1. 